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This programmatic paper seeks to develop a new perspective on the military-political identity and 
performance of militias particularly in urban environments. The militia under consideration is the 
Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix (GPP), one of the oldest and most prominent of the southern 
militias. The GPP came into being as a civil society initiative in the aftermath of the September 
2002 insurgency in Côte d’Ivoire a country which since then has lingered in a no-peace-no-war 
situation. The new perspective, here called ‘ludus pro patria’, looks at how the militias’ activity, 
organisation, and discourse is deployed in the urban public sphere and to what effect. Within the 
scope of this paper, this perspective serves to deconstruct the alleged process of ‘milicianisation’ 
as the combined effect of discursive appropriation and concrete insinuation of a subaltern youth 
initiative by national elites and international actors. In conclusion, this paper argues that the pro-
posed approach is essential for a proper understanding of two main dimensions of the militias’ 
raison d’être and modus operandi: mobility and belonging.
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  Opening move
“Au commencement, il y avait des refrains sonores. Des hymnes à 
la patrie scandés, clamés, chantés en chœur le long des principales 
artères de la cité: ‘On a été formés pour arrêter assaillants… tuer as-
saillants…” (Toha 2006).
In the winter of 2008, in the course of a visit to the citadel of Namur (Belgium), I 
walked into a sports stadium which had the motto ‘Ludus pro patria’ inscribed on top of 
its grandstand. The combination was odd. The immense athletic track, officially desig-
nated as the ‘games stadium’ (stade des jeux) is part of an age-old military site and makes 
reference to the nation-state in a monumental fashion. Looking deeper into the history 
of the citadel stadium and its late 19th century context – the booming of sports as “plai-afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 90 ]
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sirs et techniques de soi” (Foucault 1983) and the reinvention of Olympic Games with its 
ambivalent, nationalist cum imperialist overtones   (Hobsbawm 1983, 1987; Merkel 2002, 
2003; Weber s.d.) – it became clear that the figure of ‘ludus pro patria’ had the potential 
of a powerful heuristic tool.
Soon after this visit to Namur, I embarked on a research project which deals with 
urban (southern) youth militias in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular the Groupement Patriotique 
pour la Paix (GPP) which emerged in the aftermath of the September 2002 insurgency. The 
latter began with army rebels occupying the northern part of the country and is supposed 
to end with the presidential elections expected to be held in a reunified Côte d’Ivoire by 
the end of 2008. Throughout this six year period, militias have been relatively active in 
Abidjan, as well as in secondary towns and large sections of the rural areas in the south-
ern government-held part of the country. The urban militia research project continues my 
earlier research on the Ivorian student movement of the 1990s. The student union FESCI 
arguably served as a model for, and has provided strategies and personnel to the dozens 
of patriotic youth organisations which have thrived over the last six years. This so-called 
‘patriotic galaxy’ presents itself as a many-headed civil society movement which counter-
acts rebel activity in defensive and offensive ways: through sensitization and mobilisa-
tion, with a mixture of words and other, more violent forms of action. Apart from the 
trade unions and the many people’s parliaments (see Bahi 2004, Banégas 2007, Atchoua 
2008), the ‘galaxy’ includes organisations that are habitually called militias and which in 
the quote at top of this section are described as chanting and marching along Abidjan’s 
arterial roads.1
The ‘patria’ of the early 20th century evoked in Namur was a more or less stable 
version of a Westphalian state structure. One century later and in stark contrast, the pa-
rading militias of Abidjan, operate in a Côte d’Ivoire that is in a state of turmoil, and, 
according to more than one observer, engaged in a process of reinvention. This paper 
indeed situates the phenomenon of militias against the background of the no-peace-no-
war situation in which the Ivorian state finds itself.2 More particularly it addresses the 
phenomenon of ‘milicianisation’ which in the context of Côte d’Ivoire (Banégas 2008; 
Chauveau 2008) and other African countries (Marchal & Messiant 1997; Ngodi 2006) is 
seen as accompanying processes of state failure; more particularly as a top-down process 
of delegation of violence in a process of state disintegration. In contrast, this paper sug-
gests that ‘milicianisation’ in urban Côte d’Ivoire is the contingent outcome of a complex 
process whereby the appropriation and reorientation of a subaltern youth initiative by na-
tional elites, politicians, etc. as well the imposition of transnational discourses of conflict 
analysis and conflict resolution, play an important part. Of course, the GPP is not a pas-
sive victim in this process. It endorsed this evolution (a) by the way in which it presented 
and represented itself in the urban public sphere during the early stages of the conflict 
and (b) by seizing the financial, training or job opportunities which the ‘milicianisation’ 
1  The urban militia project referred to here is conducted within the framework of the EU-funded MICROCON 
project, more particularly as part of Work Package 10 ‘Governance and Institutions’.
2  For more on the concept of no-war-no-peace, see Arnaut & Højbjerg (2008).afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 91 ]
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promises to offer for the GPP members in national and transnational programmes of 
demobilisation and reintegration. While the second reason for the gradual redefinition 
of the GPP as a militia can be easily inferred from interviews and observations, the first 
phenomenon requires further explanation, in particular by looking at the GPP from a 
‘ludus pro patria’ perspective. 
In order to initiate this perspective, it will be useful to round out the above narrative 
of the methodological dimension of this paper by pointing to two further links between 
‘Namur’ and ‘Abidjan,’ firstly a well-known article and, secondly, an early encounter in 
the field.
The article in question is written by Yacouba Konaté in 2003 and speaks about the 
members of the patriotic youth movement, its thugs and its orators, as well as about its 
predecessor, the student union FESCI, as “les enfants de la balle”. The latter expression 
is surely multilayered but it basically forges a ‘ludus pro patria’ kind of combination in 
which the leisure of ball-playing or more generally youth entertainment  is seen along-
side the serious business of ‘bullets’ signifying the militarization of youngsters in ap-
pearance, tactics, and in violent action.
The second link is an encounter which I had in March 2008 with Angénor Drogban.3 
Angénor is a sports teacher at the Lycée Municipal of an important Abidjan commune but 
also holds a degree in information technology and is a part-time self-employed ICT con-
sultant. Although he is not a public figure and has never been reported overtly demon-
strating his authority in the organisations in which he was active, Angénor may be con-
sidered as one of Côte d’Ivoire’s key-actors when it comes to youth movements of the 
last two decades. In the early months of 1990 he was involved in the birth  of the student 
union FESCI and in late 2002, he was one of the founding fathers of the GPP which soon 
became Abidjan’s most well-known urban militia. During one of the first conversations I 
had with Angénor, he took stock of five years of militia activity and readily evoked the fig-
ure of ‘ludus pro patria’ by arguing that the GPP had enjoyed a double success. Not only 
had its military activity in support of the loyalist army forces, been important, he said, 
but also its physical, athletic presence in the urban public space. The latter is something 
which a friend of Angénor’s and GPP general Sancho identified as ‘le pas-gym’, a term most 
probably derived from ‘pas de gymnastique’– the typical army drill exercise which consist 
of marching or running in line while chanting in call-and-response style.
  A public sphere perspective on militias
“Never since the days of Chivalry has Sport played so large a part in the 
preparation for war as it plays to-day” (Revue Olympique 1902).
This paper looks at urban militias through the prism of ‘ludus pro patria’. More-
over, by discerning in the southern Ivorian militias a seemingly paradoxical constellation 
of guns and gaming, arms and athletics, the ‘ludus pro patria’ matrix leads us to reflect 
3  Like the other names of militiamen and women whom I quote in this text, Angénor Drogban is a pseudonym. In 
the text pseudonyms are always put in italics.afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 92 ]
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on two entangled issues: the mobility of the militiamen and women both in physical 
and in socio-economic terms (Debos 2008), and their quest for belonging which is most 
often articulated in a nationalistic, jingoistic idiom but ought perhaps to be understood 
as multilayered and pertaining to public and private aspects of political, economic, and 
social citizenship (Kalyvas 2003; Englund 2005). The programmatic nature of this paper 
should be clear and its exploratory character makes it at times resemble an essay more 
than a scholarly paper, both in terms of empirical grounding and in analytical conceptu-
alisation. In connection with the former, this paper has no comparative ambitions and 
therefore does not try to confront its data with other phenomena of ‘playful armies’ such 
as the Herero Truppenspieler (Werner 1990) or the Swahili Beni Ngoma (Ranger 1975) 
let alone with the many forms of ‘armoured’ civil society, vigilante and paramilitary or-
ganisation. The analytical scheme underlying this paper is based on emerging insights in 
the anthropology of the state which combines (a) a performative perspective on practices 
and discourses of governance, politics, and state-formation (Ferguson & Gupta 2002), as 
much as (b) the recognition of the ‘power’ of performance’, or the fact that public repre-
sentations of power are inherent to their deployment (Mbembe 1992; Askew 2002).
The point of entry into the ‘ludus pro patria’ perspective is the idea that, as the quote 
at the opening of this section indicates, there is a fine line between sports and athletics 
on the one hand and military training and activity on the other hand. Moreover, the his-
toriographical and anthropological literature bears out how effectively militaro-athletic 
performances have been in group formation, identity contests and counterhegemonic 
tug-of-war (Ranger 1975; Hobsbawm 1983, 1987; Merkel 2002, 2003). Such observations 
find support in the anthropological literature that is seeking to considerably enlarge the 
field of political expressions and performances (e.g. Mbembe & Roitman 1997; Bayart 
1992; Martin 2002; Kaarsholm & James 2000) and in the politological literature which 
offers a performative understanding of political participation (Kulynych 1997). Looking 
at militiamen and women as actors in the public sphere seeking among other things eco-
nomic and political participation, implies perceiving their organisations as, in the words 
of David Apter (1993: 30), emancipatory movements, and their actions as inversionary 
discourse in which violence (in the widest possible sense of the word) is “the ultimate 
symbolic expression, the social text, the beginning rather than the end of discourse” (see 
also Hoffman 2006 Schlichte 2005: 26-27). Finally, the ‘ludus pro patria’ perspective 
situates the performances of participation within an enlarged concept of public sphere – 
enlarged in the sense that it is sensitive to power plays (Ladrière 1992; Fraser 1993; Dahou 
2005), as well as to its materiality. The material nature of the pubic sphere comprises at 
least two important dimensions: its spatiality and bodiliness (Smith & Low 2006; Harvey 
2006; Diouf 2003; Durham 2005; Durham & Klaits 2002; Hoffman 2007).
While the analytical model outlined above requires to be refined and further elabo-
rated, the ‘ludus pro patria’ approach can, within the scope of this paper, be restricted to 
a ‘public sphere’ perspective on militias because of its focus on the way the GPP (a) needs 
to be situated within a history of ‘armoured’ civil-society initiatives by youngsters and 
students which goes back at least as far as 1990, and (b) played out its militant nature in afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 93 ]
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the urban public space in its early stages – that is before its detrimental ‘milicianisation’. 
These two foci are the subject matter of the next two sections. The first one tells the story 
of Angénor’s militancy from 1990 to 2002 which results in the creation of the GPP, and is 
followed by a reconstruction of the short history of  the GPP in which attention is drawn 
to the way the urban militia is constituted by the distribution of ‘bodies’ in urban space.4
  Angénor Drogban and his ‘old boys’ network (1990-2002)
“Premier objectif [du GPP]: […] il fallait apprendre aux gens de résis-
ter, comment résister selon les pratiques, ça peut être des pratiques 
mystiques, des pratiques physiques” (Angénor Drogban 21-03-2008).
In early 1990, Angénor, a student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure of Abidjan, joins the 
FESCI, then led by Ahipeaud Martial, and immediately enters its highest executive stra-
tum, the Bureau Exécutif National (BEN). There Angénor is deputy at the department of in-
formation while working closely together with the department of organization where 
Charles Groguhet and Touré Moussa Zéguen hold leading positions. In 1993 Angénor 
leaves the university as well as the FESCI, and takes a job as sports teacher in the small 
town of Aboisso, before returning to Abidjan in 1998 where he takes the same job at 
a Lycée Municipal. In the meantime several of his erstwhile age-mates at the FESCI have 
left the country: Ahipeaud and Zéguen are both in England while Groguhet lives in Ger-
many.5 However, successive radical turns in the political and military situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire will make them return. After the coup d’état of December 1999 when General 
Guéï takes over power, Ahipeaud returns to Abidjan and is called upon by Angénor and 
other members of his former FESCI administration to create the Mouvement des Anciens 
Responsables de la FESCI (MARFES) which explores opportunities for the emerging genera-
tion of politically interested intellectuals such as themselves in a new political landscape. 
MARFES soon breaks up between those like Ahipeaud who take the side of General Guéï 
and those, like Angénor who follow the main opposition figure, the leader of the socialist 
party FPI, Laurent Gbagbo, who since the 1990s has ‘marched’ alongside the protesting 
students. In the run-up to the elections of fall 2000, Angénor for the first time deploys the 
kind of militia activity that will become more important afterwards. On request he sets 
up a group of youngsters who guarantee the security of a ‘boss’ of the Abidjan section of 
Gbagbo’s FPI party during his public appearances. This ad hoc unit disbands as soon as 
Gbagbo wins the elections, but two years later, after the coup d’état of 2002, Angénor puts 
up a similar organization on a much larger scale.
Between the installation of Gbagbo as president in late 2000 and the coup d’état of 
September 2002, Angénor witnesses the return of his FESCI age-mates Charles Grog-
uhet and Touré Moussé Zéguen from (Europe that has brought them neither money nor 
diplomas). On return, they hope to enter a Côte d’Ivoire which will honour the heroes 
4  The fragments of historical reconstruction that are narrated in the present tense are indented.
5  On the Ivorian student diaspora to Europe in the mid-1990s, see Arnaut (2004).afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 94 ]
k. arnaut
of the early struggle for democracy which has finally brought Laurent Gbagbo to power, 
but such is not the case. While begging for attention from the Gbagbo entourage, the 
two returnees – like so many others – seek ways to re-occupy a certain position in Ivo-
rian political society, not least as a step towards a steady job or access to an otherwise 
regular income.6 Again the FESCI is used as a springboard and the three compagnons 
de route create the MIAF, the Mouvement International des Anciens de la FESCI, with Zéguen 
as president, and Groguhet and Angénor as his deputees. Like MARFES, MIAF does not 
achieve very much, but it keeps together a troika which after the September 2002 coup 
d’état decides to create the GPP. This is not to say that the creation of the GPP is an ex-
clusive affair among three comrades age-mates. Its creation is discussed (a) with former 
FESCI secretary-general Eugène Djué who soon decides to create his own paramilitary 
structure, the Union pour la Libération Totale de la Côte d’Ivoire (UPLTCI) and (b) with Charles 
Blé Goudé, leader of the COJEP (Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes) who is presently im-
posing himself as paramount leader of the patriotic youth movement (l’Alliance des Jeunes 
Patriotes). For this reason Blé Goudé chooses not to join the GPP but instead, according to 
Angénor, manages to secure some initial funding for the GPP from his contacts at the so-
cialist party headquarters and at the presidential palace. This latent need for FPI goodwill 
(and cash) is also the reason, according to Angénor, that the troika decides to put Charles 
Groguhet forward as president of the GPP because Groguhet’s family is well-known for 
its FPI enthusiasm. Zéguen becomes his deputy and Angénor chooses for himself the func-
tion of secretary-general.
What can we make of this short story that spans 12 years of youth militantism in 
the vicinity of Angénor Drogban? The least one can say is that the FESCI and the GPP are 
connected through an ‘old boys’ network that appears to be a constant source of initia-
tive and political and military-political entrepreneurship. The question as to the relative 
share of the ‘political’ and the ‘military’ dimensions of the GPP activity, is an intricate 
one and can further be elucidated by showing (a) that until recently the GPP was deeply 
embedded in the patriotic civil society and (b) how, since its creation in 1990, the student 
union FESCI  has been a civil society organisation which possessed its own militaristic 
organisation. I start with the former.
The GPP can be regarded as a civil society initiative when it was created under Grog-
uhet and that remained so when Zéguen took over in late 2003. Somewhat later the organ-
isation became member of the Coalition Nationale des Résistants de Côte d’Ivoire (CONARECI) 
– the federation of patriotic organisations led by former member of the FESCI leader-
ship and ex-president of the youth section of the FPI, Damana Pickass. The latter tried to 
counterbalance the power of another potent federation, the aforementioned Alliance des 
Jeunes Patriotes headed by Charles Blé Goudé. More importantly, the GPP retained its civil 
society profile also after August 2004 when Zéguen was replaced by the former publicity 
agent Bouazo Yoko Yoko Bernard. Like his predecessors he was a civil society figure who, 
6  The career of former FESCI leader and prominent patriotic militia leader ‘Marshall’ Eugène Djué illustrates this 
well. His many years of political militancy (see Arnaut 2006) appears to be dwindling since he has secured for 
himself a more or less regular income from a Hevea plantation in the interior of the country.afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 95 ]
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at the time of the September 2002 insurgency, was running an NGO called Volontaires pour 
le Développement de la République de Côte d’Ivoire (VDRCI) and soon after published for several 
months an anti-rebel weekly newspaper named Dessagnon, le vrai informateur. Simultane-
ously Bouazo co-founded the patriotic federation FONACI (Forum National de la Société Civ-
ile d’Ivoire) in which he himself was secretary-general, and a number of notable patriotic 
hardliners occupied leading posts: Dr. Ahoua Jr. – advisor of FPI ideologue and Speaker 
of the Ivorian National Assembly, Prof. Mamadou Koulibaly – was president while two 
FPI MPs Attéby Williams and Onko Marcel shared the vice-presidency. This shows how 
for many years the GPP and its leaders were well-connected in different strands of the 
‘patriotic’ civil society. Only in recent times, when the peace process arrived into its final 
stages after the Ouagadougou Peace Accord of March 2007, did the GPP publicise its 
identity as a paramilitary organisation. In mid-2007 the GPP co-founded the federation 
of southern militias, the Union des Mouvements d’Autodéfense du Sud (UMAS) with Bouazo as 
vice-president and Jimmy Willy, ‘general’ of the urban militia GCLCI (Groupement des Com-
battants pour la Libération de la Côte d’Ivoire) as president. The UMAS has the explicit goal of 
acting as main interlocutor with the regular army leadership as well as the international 
community in the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programmes. 
Taken together, it can be argued that the GPP sought to influence the political proc-
esses in Côte d’Ivoire and to that end decided on using violence, or the threat of vio-
lence as one of its weapons. In this, it did not differ radically from its antecedent, the 
student union FESCI which since its early days, had conducted limited paramilitary activ-
ity alongside its public performances. At the time when Ahipeaud was secretary-general 
(1990-1993) this parallel activity took place in the heart of the FESCI national executive 
committee, more particularly in collaboration with those who were responsible for the 
organisation, such as the aforementioned Charles Groguhet and Touré Moussa Zéguen. 
In contrast to the GPP, the commando-style activity of the FESCI was partly conducted 
surreptitiously by people who were not official members of the FESCI national adminis-
tration, such as the person called ‘La main noire’.7 Although the precise content of this 
paramilitary activity is difficult to identify, several interlocutors claim that it afterwards 
remained part of FESCI and even became more prominent to the extent of almost becom-
ing the FESCI’s principal activity between 2000 and 2006.8 That is when ‘les enfants de 
la balle’ saw the light of day, when the FESCI unionists were type cast as the thugs of the 
patriotic movement – and much the same was true for the GPP militiamen and women.
It is one of the standard phrases, not only among GPP members themselves but 
also among observers that the GPP militia is the armed wing of the patriotic movement; 
that the latter consists of a section that talks and a section that fights. Such polarisation, 
7  ‘La main noire’ is now a well-to-do director of a publicity firm in Abidjan. In the early 1990s as an envoy of the 
FESCI he sought the advice and support of military leaders in West-Africa such as Charles Taylor of Liberia and 
Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. Using this experience after his time in the FESCI he started an international security 
firm.
8  About two years ago, the present president of the FESCI, Augustin Mian took it upon himself to return to the 
FESCI’s core business of defending students’ interests. However, in the run up to the 2008/2009 elections, the 
politicization and militarization of the student union seems difficult to hold back.afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 96 ]
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I suggest, is not helpful. The GPP milita activity should rather be seen as deeply inter-
twined with the other patriotic activities of mass mobilisation and demonstration. After 
all, the linchpin of the mass-based populist politics of the patriotic galaxy is the physical 
presence of people in the public space. One member of the GPP expressed it as follows:
“Ceux qui parlent là, ils se basent sur, hein, les gens parce que, je prends un exem-
ple, quand Blé Goudé dit: sortez mais hé c’est nous nous qui sommes dans […], qui 
sortons. Si on sort comme ça là c’est nous qui faisons la politique” (Marie Djoudjou 
20-03-2008).
In southern Côte d’Ivoire and more particularly in Abidjan patriotic mobilisation 
was effected with a mixture of consensus and coercion (in terms of Gramsci), of ‘power’ 
and ‘violence’ (in terms of Arendt), or of ‘communicative power’ and ‘administrative 
power’ (in terms of Habermas) (see Ladrière 1992; Dahou 2005). In this, as will also be 
further substantiated in this paper, militias like the GPP played a role in the conflict-rid-
den public sphere on both sides of the consensus-coercion divide: (a) they set an example 
by showing people how to occupy public space, and even incited people to do so as part 
of the prime patriotic commitment which the GPP militiamen and women embody, and 
(b) they sometimes and in some places created a situation of insecurity for those who 
refused to participate in the patriotic public events while guaranteeing the security of 
those who did. 
Stated otherwise, the GPP operated both in the push and pull factors of patriotic 
public mobilisation with a combination of methods of coercion and consensus. Alleg-
edly, the basis of this modus operandi in the public sphere is a military training in which 
the apprentices acquire competencies that hover between what Arendt calls ‘power’ and 
‘violence’ and which command respect as much as inspire fear. This is how a GPP ‘colo-
nel major’ explains:
“On apprend, comment dirais-je, dans l‘armée on appelle ça le FCB c’est-à-dire For-
mation Commune de Base, par exemple l’essentiel donc, euh […] donc on apprend 
les éléments la salutation c’est-à-dire l’ordre serré, garde à vous, alignement, tout, 
on leur apprend à saluer, à se soumettre, à être assujettis aux supérieurs, savoir s’ali-
gner comme ça se fait dans l’armée, c’est cette petite formation là” (Zadi Bi Laurent 
20-03-2008).
In sum, the mobility of political participation and nation-building of the GPP is one 
of marching and rallying, of standing in line and keeping rank, of the occupation and 
repartition of the public sphere and of really-existing, pedestrian democracies in which 
voting with one’s feet is as important as voting with one’s hands. Using these basic un-
derstandings, we can explore the history of the GPP somewhat further.afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 97 ]
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  A short history of the GPP – the making of an urban militia (2002-2008)
“Tous se font discrets. Et pourtant, ils sont là, ces ‘jeunes coureurs’ au 
crâne rasé qui circulaient par cohorte au plus fort du conflit, dans les rues 
d’Abidjan, ceinturon en main, arborant treillis militaires et se réclamant 
des groupes d’auto-défense politiques” (Le Répère 9/3/2008).
Soon after its creation at the turn of the year 2002/2003, the GPP rapidly becomes 
a success. By the time Côte d’Ivoire commemorates the first anniversary of the rebellion 
in September 2003, Charles Groguhet is a special invitee at ‘La Sorbonne’ – one of the 
foremost people’s parliaments and prestigious venue of ‘patriotic’ mobilisation, situated 
in Plateau, the administrative and political centre of Abidjan. In his speech Groguhet 
indicates his political standing by further developing the theme ‘On est fatigué!’ which 
president Gbagbo has launched the day before. At the same time, in the public park just 
outside La Sorbonne, a delegation of about fifty GPP troops wearing T-shirts saying ‘Nou-
velles Forces’, are doing exercises. They stand in line, they march in columns, do push-
ups, shout or chant. 
When speaking about this early period, GPP ‘general’ General Sancho (GS) ex-
plains to me (K) below that indeed military parading was one of the organisation’s main 
  weapons.
GS: Dans le temps c’était du volontarisme. C’est que les volontaires. Je viens, je t’ap-
pelle dans le mouvement: viens mon ami on va combattre les mouvements qui vien-
nent d’être nés. Est-ce que tu est prêt? En retour il n’y a rien. La seule récompense 
que tu auras c’est la libération de ton pays. On a pas de subventions, on a pas de 
financiers. Non tu te débrouilles toi-même. Est-ce que tu es prêt? C’était comme ça. 
[…] Je ne sais pas si tu connais bien parce que un pas-gym c’est un mot militaire, le 
pas-gym c’est courir ensemble, quitter à Abobo pour aller jusqu’à Yopougon ou alors 
d’Abobo aller à Alépé 
K: En chantant?
GS: Oui
K: J’ai vu ça à Blokosso: les policiers. C’est quel mot encore?9
GS: Le pas-gym. Non écoute, on faisait ça c’était l’arme fatale de ce mouvement, 
c’est qu’on le faisait pour juste dissuader pour dire qu’il y avait des gens qui s’étaient 
réveillés à Abidjan et qui attendaient les rebelles. C’est ce qu’aujourd’hui a freiné la 
rébellion à entrer à Abidjan, voilà ce mouvement là […]
K: c’est–à-dire cette présence publique
9  Blokosso – a contamination of ‘Blockhaus’ and the Dyula word – so (neighbourhood/quarter) – is a small town 
quarter situated at the outskirts of the commune of Cocody, along the Abidjan laguna. Blockosso neighbours the 
presidential residence at Cocody and because of this strategic position, it regularly witnesses teams of police or 
army recruits parading through its streets often during the early hours of the day and mostly during weekends. 
As a regular resident of Blockosso since 2004 I have seen dozens of such parades; the first ones I saw in 2004 
where the so-called miliciens de Blé Goudé – youngsters who, after an appeal by Blé Goudé, had applied for mem-
bership of the regular army and pending the decision of their acceptance, organised their own training among 
which, conspicuous ‘pas-gym’ sessions in Cocody.afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 98 ]
k. arnaut
GS: Jusqu’à ce que l’opinion internationale parle: c’est des gaillards, ils sont prêts […] 
souvent on avait des renseignements généraux qui arrivaient même pour aller dénon-
cer certaines personnes qui avaient des idées tordues vis-à-vis de la crise, qu’on […] 
rapportait à la police; ah on a des renseignements, il y a un gars suspect là-bas. Au fait 
on faisait un peu la police, la sécurité de personnes et puis de tout le monde
From this and the other interviews, one can provisionally complete the picture. 
During the first year of GPP existence, the organisation spread its activities over the 
whole of the Abidjan metropolitan area, both its centres and peripheries. On the outskirts 
of the northern Abidjan commune of Abobo the GPP had a training ground where new 
recruits were given their basic training (see FCB above). Apart from that, they marched 
and walked around in Abobo which was considered as infested with pro-rebel ‘northern-
ers’, as well as in other communes such as Cocody and Yopougon. The loud marching, 
(‘pas-gym’) was the military public relations activity par excellence conducted by groups 
of young men in uniform (T-shirts) who tried to show that they were capable of counter-
acting any rebel activity in the city. In contrast, the walking, the ambulant surveillance, 
was done individually or in small groups dressed in plain clothes who could often rely on 
a network of ‘cabines’ (roadside mobile phone operators) for communication amongst 
themselves and with the GPP headquarters. After their daily activity the GPP members 
went home and dispersed throughout Abidjan.
Taken together, the GPP occupied the urban public space both conspicuously and 
inconspicuously. It sent images of defiance (‘resistance’) and framed the prospect of an 
urban guerrilla conflict not only across the demarcation line that divides Côte d’Ivoire 
into two, but also across national borders. Such a message was directed to the interna-
tional media and the UN headquarters.
In similar fashion, Angénor (21/03/2008) looks back on the merits of the ‘early’ 
GPP.
Certains objectifs ont été atteints quand-même. Le premier objectif c’est le problème 
psychologique c’est-à-dire sur le plan psychologique. L’opinion internationale voit le 
GPP comme une organisation très puissante (laughs loudly), au fond, hein, une organisa-
tion très puissante qui repose sur des milliards de francs, sur un armement sophistiqué, 
hors il n’y a rien. Ça c’est le premier objectif. Deuxième objectif, sur le plan sécuritaire 
les choses ont marché parce que beaucoup de jeunes du GPP ont travaillé dans-aux côtés 
des FDS [Forces de Défense et de Sécurité]. Ils sont allés à l’Ouest, même parce que les 
premiers, les premiers qui sont allés à l’Ouest sont des éléments du GPP, c’est-à-dire 
avant même qu’on le donne le mot d’ordre. C’est après qu’il y a eu création de l’FLGO ça 
c’est un autre débat, ça c’est des gens qui ont fait des groupes sollicités, sinon le GPP n’a 
pas été sollicité rien que par moi ma conception je n’ai pas eu besoin de quelque chose 
parce que ... je fais ce que j’ai envie de faire.10
10  The FLGO, Forces de Liberation du Grand Ouest, is a militia which has been operating in the Western part of 
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The above quote confirms and even highlights the main points which General Sancho 
made earlier. The overall picture is that of a youth militia which through its commanding 
bodily presence in Abidjan public space astonishes not only the urbanites but also its friends 
and foes far beyond the limits of the city and the country. Most interesting is that this way of 
operating in the city is connected with ideas of mobility, freedom and (financial) autonomy. 
Along these lines, one can tell the story of the further development of the GPP after the initial 
period. 
September 2003 was not only a moment of glory for the GPP, it was also a turning 
point. While Groguhet was giving his rip-roaring speech at La Sorbonne, his second in 
command Zéguen was trying to oust him. At the same time, the Ivorian prime minister 
Seydou Diarra was trying to convince the FDS to enforce the ban on the GPP which he 
had proclaimed already in August 2003. One month later the GPP was already more of 
a ‘militia’: it operated in the shadows of a shattered state, it was outlawed but tolerated, 
and considered dangerous as much for its training and arms as for its fanaticism. More 
importantly perhaps, with the departure of Groguhet and the arrival of Zéguen, the GPP 
replaced an orator with someone who eagerly pursued the logic of ‘milicianisation’ and 
gradually chose a more military format for the GPP. 
One of the main features of this militia-option was the end of dispersal in the urban 
space by the regrouping of GPP troops into camps – the first one being the Institut Marie 
Thérèse Houphouet-Boigny at Adjamé. This was the beginning of a fragmentation of the 
GPP in several camps in different parts of Abidjan – Azito (Yopougon), Palm Beach (Vri-
di), Akwaba (Vridi), and Adjouffou to name only a few. This fragmentation went hand in 
hand with the proliferation of ‘generals’ (basically camp commanders) such as Jeff Fada, 
Ato Belly, Josué, Roger Njabei, and others. This process of ‘cantonnement’ signalled the 
further transformation of the GPP in terms of mobility and financial autonomy. With 
regard to mobility, the camp-dwelling militiamen and women either stayed in the camp 
or in its vicinity where they easily started preying on the local population, most typically, 
the small merchants and local taxi-drivers. Although this income may have helped in-
dividual members, it was not sufficient to run the camp. Hence the ‘generals’ and their 
‘colonels’ were constantly in need of money to maintain the basic infrastructure of the 
camp (water, electricity, and possibly some food) as well as to keep up a certain status as 
‘general’ themselves. This money was found among a multitude of structural and occa-
sional sponsors: businessmen, political big men, ministers, the prime minister’s office 
and the presidential palace, and also customers who would pay for small security jobs or 
drugs transports undertaken by GPP members. 
Thus, already by 2004 the overall picture was that of a GPP which was gradually evac-
uating large sections of the urban public sphere and, through fragmentation and localisa-
tion, lost both its ‘political’ mobility and relative autonomy. From an imaginary ‘infantry’ 
of incalculable and hence alarming magnitude, the GPP was being reduced to a collection 
of localisable units consisting of countable individual militiamen and women. From 2005, 
(interview of 13/06/2008) he and other ‘cadres’ of the western region in accord with president Gbagbo and the 
loyalist army forces set up the militia and recruited youngsters from the region.afrika focus — Volume 21, Nr. 2 [ 100 ]
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when prime minister Charles Konan Banny took over from Diarra, this process was even 
reinforced by the logic of disarmament which demanded that militiamen and women were 
identified, counted and traceable. But, as Secretary-general Angénor was eager to point out: 
initially there was no-one to disarm, there were no arms to begin with. This, however did 
change. From the time of Zéguen and into the reign of Boazo Yoko Yoko Bernard, the 
present president of the GPP, arms had been entering the GPP albeit in relatively small 
quantities. That in urban Côte d’Ivoire the disarmament of the militias went hand in hand 
with their (reluctant) arming, serves as a stark illustration of the extent to which the ‘mili-
cianisation’ was a self-fulfilling prophecy which the GPP was basically unable to resist.
  Concluding remarks: mobility and belonging in pedestrian politics
“Le  président  préside,  le  parlement  parlemente  et  la  rue  se  rue” 
(Eugène Djué, L’intelligent d’Abidjan, 4/3/2005).
The bulk of this paper is a historical reconstruction of the creation and transforma-
tion of the GPP from what I have called a ‘ludus pro patria’ perspective. This perspective 
highlights the bodily presence of the militiamen and women in the Abidjan urban space 
as indexing political commitment. In this paper the main analytical focus has been on 
deconstructing the concept of ‘milicianisation’ as the contingent outcome of a complex 
interplay of the appropriation of a civil society initiative (a) by national elites who insinu-
ated the GPP through sponsoring and patronage as well as (b) by national and interna-
tional actors who contributed in a self-fulfilling way to shaping the GPP according to the 
format of a standard ‘militia’. In terms of the approach developed here ‘milicianisation’ 
for the GPP meant its fragmentation and ‘localization’ together with the decline of its 
character as an ephemeral, agile, omnipresent and imposing youth force. This went hand 
in hand with the shattering of the GPP’s deceptive public image as being a populous, 
heavily armed and well-trained hence threatening organisation. Stated simply: the GPP 
was the victim of its PR-success. 
Apart from enabling a critical examination of the ‘milicianisation’ process, the per-
spective developed in this paper aspires to develop a critical perspective on at least two 
central aspects of the (urban) militias in Côte d’Ivoire and beyond, namely their mobility 
and their quest for belonging. In a recent report Richards and Chauveau (2007) address 
this issue head-on by establishing a link between both. They argue that the social and 
economic hyper-mobility of West-African youngsters makes them available for recruit-
ment as militiamen and women. What makes this observation all the more relevant is the 
fact that in Côte d’Ivoire the military, inversionary projects of the last eight years (both by 
‘rebels’ and ‘patriots’) can be seen as attempts to offer the younger generation prospects 
for reducing their hyper-mobility by facilitating access to land and jobs (see e.g. Chau-
veau & Richards 2008). Conceivably, this paper has sufficiently shown that the discursive/
performative angle from which the ‘ludus pro patria’ perspective looks at mobility and 
belonging differs from the more socio-economic perspective of Richards and Chauveau 
– but could help to gain additional insights.afrika focus — 2008-12 [ 101 ]
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To  start  with  mobility,  it  is  clear  that  the  hyper-mobility  of  the  Ivorian  young-
sters both in rural and in urban areas – and indeed on a rural-urban continuum (see 
Mkandawire 2002; Murunga (2006) – is signified as negative mobility, in the way Bau-
man (1998: 96-97) defines ‘vagabonds’ in opposition to ‘tourists’. While the latter move 
around the globe as they wish, vagabonds relocate out of necessity, as the subjects of 
push and pull factors beyond their control, or as Richards and Chauveau (2007) have it, 
as footloose, jobless and landless youngsters. In contrast, by highlighting the strategic 
dimension of the GPP’s urban mobility, its ‘motoricity’ if you like, this papers tries to 
demonstrate that the militant ‘patriotic’ youngsters in the Ivorian conflict were some-
how able to manage and deploy their own mobility, albeit for only a short time, but were 
indeed unable to resist the ‘localization’ which the process of ‘milicianisation’ brought 
with it. Although this ‘tourist’ type of mobility can be observed in violent military projects 
elsewhere (Debos 2008), Diouf (2003) has shown how it can be taken into consideration 
in discursive/performative analyses of youth manifestations in the public sphere. Applied 
to the Ivorian ‘young patriots’, it becomes clear how the bodily co-presence of youngsters 
in Abidjan public spaces both in a static and a mobile way – respectively in people’s par-
liaments and (mass) demonstrations – has contributed to the symbolisation of ‘patriotic’ 
defiance (‘resistance’) and (exclusionist) identity (see Arnaut 2008). This brings me to 
two final points about belonging.
The first point concerns national belonging and the fact that the GPP in its ‘ar-
moured’ athletic public performances has been playing a central role in visualizing/ma-
terializing/embodying the youth metaphor that dominated the political and military dis-
course of the Ivorian ‘patriots’. This metaphor was based on the idea of the rejuvenation 
or the re-generation of the nation that was to be realized by its youngsters (see Arnaut 
2004; Banégas 2007). In an entirely different context, Hobsbawm has made a similar 
observation: 
“What has made sport so uniquely effective a medium for inculcating national feel-
ings, at all events for males, is the ease with which the least political or public in-
dividuals can identify with the nation as symbolized by young persons excelling at 
what practically every man wants […]. The imagined community of millions seems 
more real as a team of eleven named people” (Hobsbawm 1990: 143).
In the Ivoirian case, the political efficiency of this metaphor of rejuvenation of the 
nation cannot be overestimated. For one, it was heavily leaned upon by political entre-
preneurs such as Charles Blé Goudé in order to ‘sell’ the Ouagadougou peace accords of 
March 2007 among the young patriots. Although the latter had for years been demanding, 
and in the most explicit terms, the total destruction of the rebels, Blé Goudé succeeded 
in convincing a ‘patriotic’ public to accept reconciliation with the rebels as ‘children’ and 
‘youngsters’ of the ‘emerging’ Ivorian nation. 
The second point about belonging concerns the fact that the urban militias shaped 
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velop a sense of belonging in a city which was not only conceived as the axis of the nation 
but also as the national hub to the rest of the world, to the international media, public 
opinion and the UN headquarters. In a similar vein as Simone (2001) and Bauder (2001) 
before him, Diouf observed that:
“young Africans construct places of socialization and new sociabilities whose func-
tion is to show their difference, either on the margins of society or at its heart, si-
multaneously as victims and active agents, and circulating in a geography that escapes 
the limits of the national territory (Diouf 2003: 5; my emphasis).
The new ‘glocal’ spaces of socialization that the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire has given 
birth to are of many different sorts and include, apart from the people’s parliaments and 
the so-called ‘grins’ (see Atchoua 2008), also the different GPP subdivisions or regi-
ments, as well as the many temporary organisations such as the training camps or the 
group excursions to GPP members in other cities. These spaces of course also include 
the camps in their different forms: the relatively closed camps where GPP members dwell 
day and night or the other more open ones. The latter have become more popular over the 
last two years. There, militiamen and women pass through to share information, analyze 
events on the military and political front, or just to have a drink or a meal together. At 
this very moment, all these camps are the locus of hope and despair (about disarmament, 
reintegration and ultimately money, jobs and families). However, few GPP members lack 
the conviction that whatever the outcome, they had an enriching social experience which 
at the same time has changed the course of events not only on a national but also on an 
international level. In sum, as an urban youth ‘movement’ the GPP has contributed to the 
reinvention of Ivorian youth as glocal citizens.
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